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Abstracts
One of the focuses in capital structure studies is to identify economic forces influ-
encing corporate capital structure. We investigated the non-linear effects of the firm-
specific factors to the leverage of the firm of the US-listed firms. In the partial-ad-
justed model, growth opportunity and the size of the firm had non-linear effects on
the leverage of the firm. Growth opportunity showed quadratic effects on leverage
with a negative linear term but a positive quadratic term. It meant if the growth
opportunity of a firm reached a certain level, fund providers can relatively detect it
and subsequently causes a decrease in asymmetric information. This detection of
ample growth opportunity will increase the accessibility of external funding. Firm
size also exhibits quadratic effects on leverage with a positive linear term but a
negative quadratic term. In other words, if the firm size as a proxy of various omitted
variables was imminent, the financial market has been applied diversification dis-
count that will decrease the accessibility of external funding.
Keywords: Firm Size; Growth Opportunity; Leverage; Non-linear
JEL Classification: G32, D92
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Abstrak
Salah satu fokus kajian dalam bidang struktur modal adalah mempelajari faktor-faktor
yang memengaruhi struktur modal perusahaan. Kami meneliti efek non-linear faktor
spesifik perusahaan pada tingkat utang perusahaan-perusahaan publik di Amerika
Serikat. Pada model partial-adjusted, kesempatan bertumbuh dan ukuran perusahaan
menunjukkan efek non-linear pada tingkat utang perusahaan. Faktor kesempatan
bertumbuh menunjukkan efek kuadratik positif dan pengaruh linear negatif pada tingkat
utang. Hal ini menunjukan bahwa penyedia dana dapat mendeteksi penurunan tingkat
asimetri informasi perusahaan ketika perusahaan telah mencapai tingkat kesempatan
bertumbuh yang optimal. Penurunan asimetri informasi akan meningkatkan akses per-
usahaan pada pendanaan eksternal. Sebaliknya, ukuran perusahaan menunjukkan efek
kuadratik negatif dan efek linear positif pada tingkat utang perusahaan. Hal ini berarti
bahwa ketika ukuran perusahaan melewati titik optimalnya, pasar keuangan cenderung
menerapkan diskon diversifikasi yang akan menurunkan aksesibilitas pendanaan
eksternal. Ukuran perusahaan juga merupakan proksi berbagai variabel yang belum
masuk dalam model.
Kata Kunci: Ukuran Perusahaan; Kesempatan Bertumbuh; Tingkat Utang; Non-Linear
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Identifying economic forces to determine capital
structure is one of the major concerns in capital struc-
ture studies. Efforts to find the firm-specific deter-
minants of financial policy have shown ample re-
sults (de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Frank &
Goyal, 2009). At the same time, a group of research-
ers tries to explain the dynamics of capital struc-
tures using various types of speed of adjustments
models (Huang & Ritter, 2009; Hovakimian & Li,
2011, 2012; Faulkender et al., 2012; Castro, Tascón,
& Amor-Tapia, 2015; Chang & Dasgupta, 2018;
Gebauer, Setzer, & Westphal, 2018). Another strand
of literature focuses on improving the prediction
power of various types of leverage measures (Welch,
2011; Faulkender et al., 2012; Ferris et al., 2018), and
the empirical studies tend to use longer periods
(Graham, Leary, & Roberts, 2015).
However, the empirical models attempting to
explain the variations of the capital structure still
exhibit relatively low R2 (Lemmon, Roberts, &
Zender, 2008; Graham & Leary, 2011). Moreover,
Hang et al. (2018) argue that the measurement of
capital structure determinants is important. Stan-
dard proxies are effective in explaining the varia-
tions across industries. Nonetheless, Graham &
Leary (2011) and Lemmon et al. (2008) show that
the standard variables struggle to explain within-
firm debt ratio variation in book (market) leverage.
Ogden & Wu (2013) also argue that the test results
of both static and dynamic trade-off theories sug-
gest under-fitting of the essential and stable factors.
Lemmon et al. (2008) also opine that much of
the leverage variation is time-invariant. They also
argue that most of the well-known firm-specific
determinants cannot explain the leverage variation
since there are still some significant omitted com-
ponents of leverage. They show that between firm
variation is approximately 50 percent larger than
within-firm variation (Lemmon et al., 2008; Graham
& Leary, 2011) and the majority of the across-firm
variation is within a given industry (Graham &
Leary, 2011; Leary & Roberts, 2014). Using the past
century dataset, Graham, Leary, & Roberts (2015)
also verify that the firm-specific determinants have
limited power to explain the observed capital struc-
ture. Hovakimian & Li (2011) use simulated data to
show that the results of adding time-invariant com-
ponents must be interpreted cautiously. Then,
Lemmon et al. (2008) argue that a dynamic specifi-
cation is necessary due to the presence of a signifi-
cant unobserved transitory component.
On the other hand, Graham & Leary (2011)
contend that the standard model’s ineffectiveness
to explain the leverage variation lies not in the mod-
els themselves, but the biased measurement of em-
pirical leverage and proxies for firm characteristics.
Ogden & Wu (2013) show a meaningful increase of
R2 by altering linear growth opportunities to a non-
linear one. Graham & Leary (2011) also show an
empirical non-linear pattern of size and leverage
level. Besides the tax-based model, Kale, Noe, &
Ramirez (1991) suggest that the relation between
the volatility of the cash flow and leverage ratio
might be non-monotonic. Their model has not yet
captured the dynamic aspect of the target leverage.
Although research emphasizing the nonlinearity
of each variable has been published, attempts to in-
corporate misspecification errors together with
nonlinearity of each variable are still rare. There-
fore, we try to analyze how much variation of ex-
isting models can be improved by applying
nonlinearity of the variables with the target lever-
age as one of the independent variables.
Our main contribution is to identify new non-
linear effects on the capital structure. We find a qua-
dratic function of growth opportunity and firm size
to the capital structure. Variable of growth oppor-
tunity has a negative linear term and positive qua-
dratic term. It means until a certain level of growth
opportunity, the usage of external funding (debts)
decreases. This result is identical with the study by
Ogden & Wu (2013). They show that the function of
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inverse exponential to the leverage ratio. However,
our model can explain the influence of big growth
opportunity on the firm’s leverage. Fund providers
can detect if the growth opportunity of a firm
reaches a certain level, which subsequently reduces
the asymmetric information and increases the ac-
cessibility of external funding.
The firm size shows a positive linear term and
a negative quadratic term in their polynomial func-
tion. It means that until certain level firm size has
positive effects with decreasing rate to the leverage
of the firm. It happens because, with an increase of
the firm size, accessibility of the firm to external
funding tends to increase due to the decline of asym-
metric information (Titman & Wessels, 1988; Gra-
ham & Leary, 2011). However, after a certain level,
the increase of firm size may reduce the leverage.
Graham & Leary (2011) already describe the phe-
nomenon, but they have not explained the reasons.
If we agree with Parsons & Titman (2008) that firm
size is a proxy of omitted factors, and one of the
main omitted factors is diversification discount
(Schmid & Walter, 2008; Ammann, Hoechle, &
Schmid, 2012), then fund providers may apply the
sizable diversification discount. Hence, when the
firm size is too big, the accessibility of external fund-
ing will decrease attributable to the diversification
discount and agency costs increase.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we discuss the relevant literature re-
view related to non-linear and linear determinants
of the leverage of the firm. In Section 3, we describe
the data and non-linear model. In Section 4, we
present the empirical results. In Section 5 we dis-
cuss the findings. In Section 5, we run robustness
tests based on size and book to market ratio, and in
Section 6 we conclude the paper.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Numerous empirical papers have found the
major firm-specific factors influencing the leverage
of the firm. In this study, we just focus on several
major firm-specific factors: (1) target leverage
(Huang & Ritter, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012;
Chauhan & Huseynov, 2018); (2) growth opportu-
nity (Wu & Yeung, 2012; Li & Mauer, 2016); (3) size
(Bharath, Pasquariello, & Wu, 2009; Frank & Goyal,
2009; Graham & Leary, 2011); (4) profitability (Danis,
Rettl, & Whited, 2014; Frank & Goyal, 2015); (5)
volatility earnings (Kale, Noe, & Ramirez, 1991;
Graham & Leary, 2011;); and (6) median industry
leverage (de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Frank &
Goyal, 2009).
Firms with high growth opportunities will
have high market values relative to book values.
They likely have good prospects relative to the value
of assets in place. Growth opportunities add to firm
values but do not generate current taxable income
immediately because firms can invest heavily in the
future. Therefore, firms with growth opportunities
may choose to maintain financial slack to fund these
future investments (Parsons & Titman, 2008). Al-
ternatively, firms with high market-to-book ratios
are overvalued and have an incentive to use more
equity financing (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Dudley,
2012).
Meanwhile, Wu & Yeung (2012) propose a non-
linear relationship between growth opportunities
and leverage. They identify two types of asymmet-
ric information, asset-in-place and growth oppor-
tunities. They say that if asymmetric information
arises more from assets-in-place than from growth
opportunities, such firms are more debt financing
oriented. In contrast, if asymmetric information
arises more from growth opportunities than from
asset-in-place, these firms are more equity financ-
ing oriented.
Ogden & Wu (2013) also suggest a convex re-
lationship between growth opportunities and lever-
age of the firm based on benefits versus costs of
debt with the change of the growth opportunities.
They document an empirically non-linear relation-
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ship between growth opportunities and leverage of
the firm. If the growth opportunity of a firm is sub-
stantial enough, it reduces the asymmetric informa-
tion that will increase accessibility and the possibil-
ity of external funding from financial institutions
and the capital market. Graham & Leary (2011) also
reveal a non-linear, quadratic relation where market-
to-book ratio measures the growth opportunity of a
firm. Therefore, the first hypothesis in this study is:
H1: growth opportunity shows a negative linear
impact and a positive curvilinear impact on
the leverage of the firm
Many studies find the firm size to be posi-
tively related to leverage (de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen,
2008; Graham & Leary, 2011; Dudley, 2012) because
the fixed costs of refinancing are proportionally cost-
lier for smaller firms. Firm size may also be inversely
related to the costs a firm incurring financial dis-
tress or bankruptcy. Parsons & Titman (2008) men-
tion that there is no “pure” size effect at all, but
firm size is a proxy of some omitted factors that
influence borrowing costs like the level of diversifi-
cation. Because larger firms tend to be more diver-
sified, it is likely that they have lower volatility in
profits, cash flows, and firm values which will lower
the probability of costly bankruptcy or financial dis-
tress and increase debt capacities.
However, Schmid & Walter (2008) report a
sizable diversification discount. They mention that
there is a trade-off between benefits and the costs
related to the diversification level. Thus if the level
of diversification is higher than optimal, diversifi-
cation discount tends to decrease the value of the
firm. This diversification discount can cause nonlin-
ear relation between firm size and leverage level.
Graham & Leary (2011) show an empirical non-lin-
ear pattern of size and leverage level over the pe-
riod 1974-2009. Therefore, the second hypothesis in
this study is:
H2: firm size exhibits a positive linear impact and
a negative curvilinear impact on the leverage
of the firm
Previous studies have documented some fac-
tors affecting the firm capital structure. In this study,
we employ volatility of earnings, profitability, as-
set tangibility, and the median of the industry le-
verage as the control variables.
Majority of the existing empirical work as-
sumes that the relation between earnings’ volatility
and the leverage is monotonic (Wald, 1999;
Faulkender et al., 2012). However, the tax-based
model of Kale, Noe, & Ramirez (1991) suggest that
the relation between the volatility of cash flow and
leverage ratio may be non-monotonic. Kale, Noe, &
Ramirez (1991) show that the value-maximizing firm
minimizes the value of the government’s option
portfolio which is long in the corporate tax option
and short in the personal tax option for creditors of
the firm. Then cash flow volatility will have U-
shaped effects on the debt level of the firm (Gra-
ham & Leary, 2011). Earnings volatility is measured
by the standard deviation of earnings before inter-
est and tax to total assets (at least 3 years) in 10
years.
Firms prefer raising capital from internal to
external because of the costs issuing new equity and
asymmetric information (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The
profitability of a firm that increases the amount of
retained earnings may decrease the usage of debts.
This negative relation between profitability and le-
verage is documented in (de Jong, Verbeek, &
Verwijmeren, 2011; Danis, Rettl, & Whited, 2014)
and has been confirmed in numerous subsequent
studies. The profitability of the firm is measured by
earnings before interest and tax to total assets.
It is commonly said that tangible assets pre-
serve their value better during a default, and as such,
increase the recovery rates of creditors (Frank &
Goyal, 2009). The closely related idea is that the costs
of redeploying tangible assets are lower than for
intangible assets (Campello & Giambona, 2013).
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Graham & Leary (2011) show that higher PPE,
however, is associated with higher leverage, but the
PPE effect is non-monotonic. It is not clear also
whether all forms of PPE are equally valuable as
collaterals (Benmelech & Bergman, 2009; Campello
& Giambona, 2013). They show that the portion of
total re-deployable tangible assets instead of the total
tangible assets affect the amount and structure of
debt that can be borrowed. Benmelech & Bergman
(2009) also find that collateral characteristics affect
debt maturity. Firms with more saleable assets (the
combination of asset deplorability and asset liquid-
ity) may use longer-term debt. Campello &
Giambona (2013) show that land and buildings,
which are more deployable than other forms of PPE,
support greater debt usage of the firm. PPE to total
assets measures asset tangibility of the firm.
There are substantial cross-industry differ-
ences in leverage ratio dispersion (Almazan &
Molina, 2005). Almazan & Molina (2005) show that
the nature of the assets within an industry deter-
mines the level and dispersal of capital structure for
that industry. Leary & Roberts (2014) show that
peer effects for capital structure determination arise
from a learning motive and are partially driven by
a response to their peers. Peer effects of capital struc-
ture are stronger for smaller, less successful firms
compared to the larger, more successful peers.
However, some research includes industry
effects on their model to mitigate the omitted effect
which may be correlated with one or more observ-
able proxies, leading to biased coefficient estimates
(Parsons & Titman, 2008; Ogden & Wu, 2013). Us-
ing a non-linear relationship of growth opportuni-
ties to the leverage, Ogden & Wu (2013) show that
the explanatory power of industry median decreases
significantly. Industry median leverage is measured
by total debt to total assets based on 48 industrial
classifications of Fama & French (2007).
METHODS
The data are obtained from COMPUSTAT and
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) cov-
ering the period from 1984-2011. Financial and util-
ity industries are excluded from the sample because
the former has a different financial structure, and
the latter is under government regulation. We ex-
clude the firms with zero or total negative assets
from the data. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile to control for the outliers’ ef-
fect.
We apply a target adjustment model in the
line of (Huang & Ritter, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012)
to get the target leverage  ( ),.
 
Following Huang & Ritter (2009), we use
growth opportunity (MB), size of the firm (SIZE),
profitability (PROF), asset tangibility (TANG), and
volatility of the earnings (VOL) as the determinants.
Titman & Wessels (1988) note that even if firms
choose completely random “target” book leverages,
a spurious statistical relation may arise between
market leverage and variables similarly scaled by
market value. When market values increase, both
the right- and left-hand side variables are simulta-
neously affected, albeit by reasons that have little
to do with the spirit of the test. For this reason,
many researchers prefer to scale debt by the book
value of assets instead. Managers appear to be con-
cerned mostly with the book value of leverage, as
indicated by survey evidence Graham & Harvey
(2001). To reduce the measurement errors, we mea-
sure the leverage by total debt to total assets (Titman
& Wessels, 1988).
RESULTS
Nonlinear Effects of Firm-Specific Factors on
Leverage
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the
main variables. The sample indicates a mean lever-
age ratio of 29.4 percent which is a little higher than
(1)
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the median. Industry leverage shows a little lower
mean, but a higher median. The mean of earnings’
volatility (VOL) is 0.06725 while the standard de-
viation is 0.58363. The high standard deviation
shows a high variation of earnings volatility be-
tween firms. It can also be seen in the Q1, median,
and Q3 where the Q3 (75 percentile) still smaller
than mean. In another word, the observations that
are bigger than 75 percentiles dominate the mean
and standard deviation of earnings volatility.
Table 2 reports non-linear effects of the vari-
able growth opportunity (MB) and the size of the
firm (SIZE) on, and volatility of earnings (VOL).
Effects of target leverage from (1) to (10) equation
to current leverage are consistently significant at 1
percent, and there is no meaningful change of speed
of adjustment. These results are consistent with other
dynamic model results even if the magnitude of the
speed of adjustment is different (Huang & Ritter,
2009).
Second equation of Table 2 indicates the non-
linear effects of the MB on leverage. As MB in-
creases, the leverage decreases until certain level
with decreasing scale. After a certain level, with the
increase of MB, the leverage of the firm also in-
creases. This non-linear association between lever-
age and growth opportunity is a different pattern
from Graham & Leary (2011) and Ogden & Wu
(2013). They show a negative and convex associa-
tion between growth opportunity and leverage.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
LEV 0.29419 0.27703 0.03724 0.25438 0.45165 
SIZE 6.41461 2.16045 4.89549 6.37860 7.88586 
PROF  0.06418 0.15853 0.03514 0.08617 0.13884 
MB 2.98052 3.73325 1.28193 2.10924 3.53049 
TANG 0.12730 0.16703 0.00165 0.05254 0.19712 
VOL 0.06725 0.58362 0.01965 0.03681 0.06649 
IN_LEV  0.28572 0.15418 0.15500 0.30600 0.40000 
 LEV is measured by total debts to total assets; Size is measured by log (total assets); PROF is measured by earnings before interest and tax to total
assets; MB is measured by market value of the equity to book value of equity; TANG is measured by property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total
assets; VOL is measured by standard deviation of the earnings before interest and tax to total assets in 10 years; IN_LEV is measured based on 48
Fama-French industrial classification.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables (N= 25.603 firm-year)
Third, sixth, and ninth equations of Table 2
confirm non-linear, more specifically quadratic in-
fluence of growth opportunity and size on the le-
verage with well-known firm-specific determinants
of capital structure. The profitability and asset tan-
gibility variables show consistent evidence with much
previous research (de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008;
Frank & Goyal, 2009). Growth opportunity has qua-
dratic effects on leverage with a negative coefficient
of the linear term and positive coefficient of the
quadratic term. In contrast, size exhibits a positive
coefficient of the linear term and a negative coeffi-
cient of the quadratic term.
Non-Linear Effects of the Firm-Specific Factors
to Leverage in Financially Constrained and
Non-Financially Constrained Firms
Previous studies have suggested various prox-
ies to identify financially constrained firms even if
there is no general agreement, dividend payout ra-
tio (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004), firm size,
and KZ index based on qualitative information from
financial reports (Hadlock & Pierce, 2016) as prox-
ies of financially constrained and non-financially
constrained firms. We use annual payout ratio as a
proxy to separate financially constrained firms from
the non-constrained firms.
Equations of (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) of Table
3 indicate non-linear effects of growth opportunity
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
LEVt-1  0.815***  0.782***  0.785***  0.834***  0.827***  0.753***  0.814***  0.814***  0.723*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
MB -0.00092  -0.0144***  -0.0152***    -0.0153***   -0.0153*** 
 (0.428)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)    (0.000)  
MBSQ   0.00077*** 0.00080***    0.00081***    0.00081*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
SIZE  0.0211*** 0.0188  0.0597***  0.121***    0.121*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  
SIZESQ     -0.00306***  -0.00756***    -0.00775*** 
     (0.009) (0.000)   (0.000)  
VOL    -0.00311   0.00409 0.00220 -0.00921 -0.00640  
   (0.649)   (0.396) (0.479) (0.565) (0.700)  
VOLSQ        0.000283 0.000268  
        (0.414) (0.453) 
PROF   -0.138***   -0.203***   -0.203*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
TANG   0.0631   0.0847***   0.0838*** 
   (0.051)   (0.008)   (0.000)  
IN_LEV   0.0594*   0.0490*   0.0491* 
   (0.016)   (0.038)   (0.038)  
_cons 0.0496*** 0.0829*** -0.0603*** -0.1771***  -0.197*** -0.324***  0.0471*** 0.0477*** -0.345*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald chi2  1513.4  1976.6  1916.7 1342.6  1349.5  1908.4   1482.6  1491.7  1937.8  
p-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Arellano Bond 
AR(2)  
 
0.6007  
 
0.6900  
 
0.6544  
 
0.6158  
 
0.5868  
 
0.6100  
 
0.6096  
 
0.6176  
 
0.6202 
 
Table 2. Non-linear Effects of MB and SIZE to the Firm Leverage
LEV is measured by total debts to total assets; Size is measured by log(total assets); PROF is measured by earnings before interest and tax to total
assets; MB is measured by the market value of the equity to book value of equity; TANG is measured by property, plant, and equipment to total assets;
VOL is measured by standard deviation of the earnings before interest and tax to total assets in 10 years; IN_LEV is measured based on 48 Fama-
French industrial classification. Each equation is estimated with two-stage GMM method in a dynamic panel model (N=25,603 firm-year). We estimate
using xtdpdsys with the options of two-stage and vce(robust) to reduce the heteroskedastic problems. However, xtdpdsys cannot provide Sargan
over-identification test results. Because Parente & Silva (2012) and Deaton (2010) mention the limitations of over-identification in instrument
variables’ test, we then focus on the heteroskedastic problem and autoregressive problem. We report only Arellano Bond test AR(2) results.
p-values in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
and firm size to the leverage in financially con-
strained (FC) firms. Other equations of Table 3 show
non-linear effects of growth opportunity and firm
size to the leverage in non-financially constrained
(NFC) firms. The coefficient of equation (9) and (10)
of Table 3 indicate that growth opportunity and firm
size from both financially constrained and non-fi-
nancially constrained firms still have the same non-
linear effects on the leverage of the firm.
We then focus on other pairs of equations
which are (3) & (4), and (9) & (10). If we compare
the coefficients of primary and quadratic terms from
(3) & (4) and (9) & (10), they are almost identical.
We expect growth opportunity for the financially
constrained firm has more negative effects on the
leverage of the firm. It could happen because finan-
cially constrained firms have more asymmetric in-
formation than non-financially constrained. How-
ever, these results are consistent with our main find-
ings. We can argue that the financial condition of
the firm does not change the non-linear effects of
the growth opportunity to the leverage of the firm.
Equations (7) & (8) and (9) & (10) of Table 3
show almost identical non-linear effects of the size
of the firm on leverage. These findings also support
our arguments that the leverage of the firm increases
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 FC NFC FC NFC FC NFC FC NFC FC NFC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LEVt-1  0.765***  0.806***  0.721***  0.768***  0.780***  0.830***  0.774***  0.819***  0.735***  0.713*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
MB  -0.00112  -0.00256***  -0.0165***  -0.0174***      -0.0170***  -0.0160*** 
 (0.414)   (0.097)  (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
MBSQ   0.00087***  0.00086***     0.0009***  0.0009*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZE     0.0227***  0.0225***  0.0555***  0.0873***  0.150***  0.128*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZESQ       -0.00253  -0.00488*  -0.0096***  -0.0079*** 
       (0.141)  (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
PROF         -0.241***  -0.239*** 
         (0.000)  (0.000) 
TANG         0.0828*  0.0917*  
         (0.037)  (0.043)  
VOL         0.0310  0.00433  
         (0.526)  (0.267)  
In_LEV         0.107**  0.0312 
         (0.005)  (0.419)  
_cons  0.0619***  0.0565***  0.102***  0.0926***  -0.0878***  -0.101*  -0.181*  -0.299***  -0.354***  -0.439*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
N  12462  12741 12462 12741 12462 12741 12462 12741 12462 12741 
Wald chi2  758.3  863.1  972.7  1436.3  720.1  673.6  728.2  711.0  1569.2  1121.4  
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Arellano  
Bond AR(2)  
 
0.5245  
 
0.8026  
 
0.4285  
 
0.8149  
 
0.5196  
 
0.9518  
 
0.5020  
 
0.9208  
 
0.3775  
 
0.8925 
 
Table 3. Non-Linear Effects to Financially Constrained (FC) and Non-Financially Constrained (NFC) Firms
LEV is measured by total debts to total assets; Size is measured by log(total assets); PROF is measured by earnings before interest and tax to total
assets; MB is measured by the market value of the equity to book value of equity; TANG is measured by property, plant, and equipment to total assets;
VOL is measured by standard deviation of the earnings before interest and tax to total assets in 10 years; IN_LEV is measured based on 48 Fama-
French industrial classification. Equations (1), (3),(5),(7) and (9) are estimated based on non-divided paying firms (FC), while other equations are
estimated based dividend-paying firms (NFC). Each equation is estimated with two-stage GMM method in a dynamic panel model (N=25,603 firm-
year).
p-values in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
until the average size of the firm, but if the size of
the firm increases more than the average, firm size
tends to decrease the leverage because of the di-
versification discount effect (Schmid & Walter, 2008;
Ammann, Hoechle, & Schmid, 2012).
DISCUSSION
Our empirical results suggest that growth
opportunity exhibit curvilinear impact on the firm
capital structure. The linear (quadratic) term of the
growth opportunity demonstrates a negative (posi-
tive) effect on the capital structure. It means that
growth opportunity tends to positively impact le-
verage with a decreasing rate until the firm reaches
its optimum capital structure level. When firms in-
crease their leverage, the asymmetric information
will also tend to increase. When the asymmetric in-
formation increases below its optimum level, it will
send a negative signal to the financial market.
Hence, the market may reduce the firm external
funding. However, if the level of growth opportu-
nity is substantial (beyond its optimum level), then
the financial market will learn more about the firm
which in turn will reduce the asymmetric informa-
tion. Henceforth, the growth opportunity will have
a positive effect on leverage with an increasing rate.
Wu & Yeung (2012) also report a non-linear
association between growth opportunity and lever-
age without specific form. Perhaps this result is re-
lated to the financial market cognizance of certain
firms’ significant growth opportunity. High growth
opportunity can be regarded as risk as well as good
investment opportunities to get stable cash inflows.
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In other words, the firm with big enough growth
opportunity can access the financial market with
reduced risk. Then, the leverage of the firm can in-
crease if and only if the firm’s growth opportunity
is increasing to more than a certain level.
Different from growth opportunity, we find
firm size also exhibits quadratic effects on the le-
verage of the firm, but with a different pattern. Firm
size shows a positive (negative) linear (quadratic)
impact on leverage. The fourth equation of Table 2
indicates a linear impact of the firm size on the le-
verage. This result is consistent with almost all pre-
vious empirical evidence (de Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen,
2008; Frank & Goyal, 2009). The fifth equation of
Table 2 shows a quadratic relation between the firm
size and leverage. This result is consistent with Gra-
ham & Leary (2011). They show that when the size
increases below the mean, then the leverage in-
creases as well. When the size increases more than
the mean, then the leverage decreases. This qua-
dratic relationship between size and leverage can
be explained if these two conditions are satisfied.
First, there is no “pure” size effect at all, but firm
size is a proxy of some of the omitted factors influ-
encing borrowing costs Parsons & Titman (2007).
Secondly, one of the dominant omitted variables is
the diversification level of the firm. If the level of
diversification is higher than optimal, then the di-
versification discount tends to decrease the value
of the firm (Schmid & Walter, 2008; Ammann,
Hoechle, & Schmid, 2012). Financial market can cal-
culate the real value of the firm after sizable dis-
count because of diversification. Hence, the quadratic
relationship between the size of the firm and lever-
age exists.
 SMALL BIG SMALL BIG SMALL BIG SMALL BIG SMALL BIG 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LEVt-1  0.763***  0.807***  0.721***  0.769***  0.779***  0.829***  0.778***  0.820***  0.714***  0.735*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MB  -0.00118   -0.00265  -0.0160***  -0.0177***     -0.0159***  -0.0172*** 
 (0.356)  (0.091)   (0.000)   (0.000)       (0.000)   (0.000)  
MBSQ   0.00084***  0.00086***     0.0009***  0.0009*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZE     0.0230***  0.0230***  0.0522*  0.0843***  0.124***  0.150*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZESQ       -0.00224  -0.00462*  -0.0076***  -0.0096*** 
       (0.176)  (0.015)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
PROF         -0.230***  -0.247*** 
         (0.000)  (0.000)  
TANG         0.0918*  0.0941*  
         (0.043)  (0.034)  
VOL         0.00429  0.0354  
         (0.269)  0.475)  
IN_LEV         0.0330  0.105** 
         (0.378)  (0.007)  
_cons  0.0623***  0.0564***  0.100***  0.093***  -0.0896**  -0.0104*  -0.174*  -0.284***  -0.356***  -0.449*** 
 (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.020)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
N 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 
Wald chi2  747.9  862.2  946.8  1436.8  699.1  658.9  749.1  700.5  1107.5  1560.2  
p-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Arellano  
Bond AR(2) 
 
0.5272  
 
0.8187  
 
0.4348  
 
0.9494  
 
0.5225  
 
0.9494  
 
0.5088  
 
0.9208  
 
0.8586  
 
0.8969 
 
Table 4. Robustness Test of Non-linear Effects on Small vs. Big Firms
LEV is measured by total debts to total assets; Size is measured by log(total assets); PROF is measured by earnings before interest and tax to total
assets; MB is measured by the market value of the equity to book value of equity; TANG is measured by property, plant, and equipment to total assets;
VOL is measured by standard deviation of the earnings before interest and tax to total assets in 10 years; IN_LEV is measured based on 48 Fama-
French industrial classification. Equations of (1), (3),(5),(7) and (9) are estimated using small firms and others are big firms. Each equation is estimated
with two-stage GMM method in a dynamic panel model (N=25,603 firm-year).
p-values in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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The impact of growth opportunity and size
on the capital structure is robust for dividend-pay-
ing firms and non-dividend paying firms. In the next
section, we provide further robustness tests based
on different firm sizes and book to market ratios.
Further Robustness Tests
To check the sensitivity of our empirical
model, we use two types of robustness tests. Firstly,
we divide firms based on firm size. Firm size can be
regarded as a proxy for the financial constraints of
the firm (Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach, 2004).
Simultaneously firm size can represent other deter-
minants of capital structure (Parsons & Titman,
2008). Equations of (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) of Table
4 indicate non-linear effects of variable growth
opportunity and firm size to the leverage of small
firms. Other equations of Table 4 show non-linear
effects of variable growth opportunities and firm
size of big firms to the leverage. We cannot find
any different evidence with our main findings.
Growth opportunity (firm size) has consistently
unveiled quadratic effects on the leverage of the firm
with a negative (positive) linear term and positive
(negative) quadratic term.
Secondly, we run an alternative robustness
check based on the book to market ratio. (Fama &
French, 1993) mention that book to market ratio is
related to the bankruptcy probability. It is reason-
able to think that the growth opportunity of a high
book to the market firm is undervalued compared
to a low book to the market firm. A firm with low
book to market has higher potential bankruptcy
 HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW HIGH LOW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LEVt-1  0.755***  0.811***  0.710***  0.772***  0.774***  0.837***  0.773***  0.828***  0.698***  0.742*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
MB  -0.00147* -0.00187*** -0.0172***  -0.0172***     -0.0166***  -0.0170*** 
 (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000) 
MBSQ   0.000888*** 0.000874***     0.000898*** 0.000876*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZE     0.0230***  0.0227***  0.0617***  0.0709***  0.143***  0.143*** 
     (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
SIZESQ       -0.00291** -0.00366*** -0.00901*** -0.00893*** 
       (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
PROF         -0.256***  -0.227*** 
         (0.000)  (0.000)  
TANG         0.0994*  0.0657  
         (0.024)  (0.087)  
VOL         0.00406  0.0151  
         (0.354)  (0.730)  
IN_LEV         0.0415  0.102** 
         (0.297)  (0.005)  
_cons  0.0657*** 0.0526***  0.106***  0.089***  -0.0887*** -0.0950*** -0.203*  -0.243***  -0.407***  -0.431*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.046)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
N 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 12579 12624 
Wald chi2  665.4  972.2  910.6  1445.6  4159.9  679.8  668.7  831.9  1028.4  1561.3  
p-value  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Arellano  
Bond AR(2)  
 
0.3599  
 
0.9169  
 
0.2810  
 
0.6077  
 
0.3564  
 
0.8591  
 
0.3436  
 
0.8827  
 
0.2532  
 
0.7261 
 
Table 5. Robustness Test of Non-linear Effects on Firms with High Market to Book Ratio vs. Low Market to Book Ratio
LEV is measured by total debts to total assets; Size is measured by log(total assets); PROF is measured by earnings before interest and tax to total
assets; MB is measured by the market value of the equity to book value of equity; TANG is measured by property, plant, and equipment to total assets;
VOL is measured by standard deviation of the earnings before interest and tax to total assets in 10 years; IN_LEV is measured based on 39 Fama-
French industrial classification. Equations of (1), (3),(5),(7) and (9) are estimated using firms with a high book to market ratio and others are firms with
low book to market ratio. Each equation is estimated with two-stage GMM method in a dynamic panel model (N=25,603 firm-year).
p-values in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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costs. If then effects of the growth opportunity on
the leverage are different in between the two groups,
then firms with a higher book to market ratio re-
ceive a deeper discount than firms with a lower book
to market ratio.
Equations (1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) of Table 5
indicate non-linear effects of growth opportunity
and/or firm size to the leverage of firms with a high
book to market ratios. Other equations of Table 5
show non-linear effects of growth opportunity and
size on the leverage of firms with low book to mar-
ket ratios. We do not find any different evidences
with our main findings. Growth opportunity (firm
size) has consistently displayed quadratic effects on
the leverage of the firm with a negative (positive)
linear term and positive (negative) quadratic term.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
We use total debts to total assets as a proxy
for the capital structure to reduce the measurement
errors (Titman & Wessels, 1988). We focus on the
non-linear effects of growth opportunity and firm
size on the capital structure. Based on a panel dataset
of non-financial and non-utilities of the US-listed
firms in 1984-2011, we learn that growth opportu-
nity shows quadratic effects on the leverage of the
firm. The linear (quadratic) term of the growth op-
portunity shows a negative (positive) effect on the
leverage. It means that growth opportunity tends
to positively impact leverage with a decreasing rate
until the firm reaches its maximum leverage level.
The increase of leverage is in line with the increase
of growth opportunity and firm value along with
the increase of asymmetric information.
The increase of asymmetric information will
tend to reduce the firm external funding. However,
if the level of growth opportunity is substantial,
then the financial market will realize its potentials
and reduce the asymmetric information. Henceforth,
the growth opportunity will have a positive effect
on leverage with an increasing rate because the firm
can increase its accessibility to external funding.
Firm size also displays quadratic effects on
the leverage of the firm, but with a different pat-
tern. Firm size shows a positive (negative) linear
(quadratic) effect on leverage. It means that until a
certain level, firm size has a positive effect on the
leverage of the firm with a decreasing rate. It hap-
pens because the increase in firm size will also in-
crease the accessibility of external funding due to
the reduction of asymmetric information. In con-
trast, if the firm size is too big, the firm size will
negatively affect the leverage of the firm with an
increasing rate. If the firm size is too big, the finan-
cial market will apply the diversification discount
on the firm due to the agency cost increase.
The results are robust for firms with financial
constraints and without financial constraints. The
outcomes are also robust for small and big firms, as
well as for firms with high and low market to book
ratios.
Suggestions
The results suggest that the companies’ man-
agement should strive to maintain the companies’
growth. The financial market appreciates companies
with ample growth opportunities by giving them
better financing terms. On the other hand, compa-
nies should maintain their business focus because
the financial market tends to apply diversification
discount to highly diversified companies.
One of the limitations of this study is that we
only focus on the internal firm factors that may im-
pact the firm’s capital structure. Further studies
should attempt to find additional internal and ex-
ternal factors that may impact the capital structure
of the firm. One of the external factors that may
impact the behavior of the firm is the macroeconomic
conditions in which it operates, e.g., crisis vs. non-
crisis.
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